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Abstract

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) went farther than any other
previous BRAC in attempting to discover budgetary efficiencies by redefining domestic
military infrastructure. BRAC recommendation #146 set into motion the construct of
joint basing in which installation support responsibilities were transferred to leadComponents resulting in 12 major mergers of 26 military installations. Much has been
written on the cost savings progress of joint bases; however little has been written in
academia as to the implementation challenges that have hindered true cost savings from
being realized.
This research leverages the Delphi Method in capturing and ranking the top issues
to aid senior leaders in resource allocation decision-making. Leaders from base support
functions such as logistics, force support, security forces, civil engineering, and
command staff comprised the expert panel that led to the identification of the top 13 joint
basing challenges. This research was scoped to one AF-led, Navy-supported joint base,
but has transportability to other joint bases and contributes to the mergers and
acquisitions body of knowledge. The results of this research validate the current issues
plaguing joint bases and consider the implications of future joint basing efforts.
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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHALLENGES OF JOINT BASING

I. Introduction

Background

Necessity for Change: General Case
Resource constraints drive organizations, both large and small, toward decisions
that reduce its fiscal footprint while, at the same time, improve efficiency and
effectiveness. Historically, businesses have accomplished this by downsizing their
personnel, redirecting and repurposing assets, and reshaping their organizational mission.
As time marches on, the operating environment inevitably changes which causes
organizations to change as well or face the consequences of becoming irrelevant and
ineffective. The commercial sector has transformed itself as products become obsolete,
competition intensifies, and stakeholders continue to demand that value be maximized
and waste, as a corollary, be minimized. The government arena, specifically the
Department of Defense (DoD), is no different.

Necessity for Change: Military Case
It is important to see the parallels between the DoD and commercial sector in
order to understand why certain resource decisions are made. The DoD produces a
product (war and humanitarian assistance) for stakeholders (the American people) with
resources (land/bases, personnel, assets, etc.). The object of war and humanitarian
endeavors continually shift in the strategic sense, which, in turn, drives operational
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requirements. Emphasis on suppression of communist influence during the Cold War
necessitated heavy resource-staging across the world. In today’s political environment, a
lighter and more agile force has proven more appropriate against the current global
threats. Technological changes have increased the capability of both kinetic and nonkinetic effects, further decreasing the need for Cold War-level resource-staging. In the
midst of technological advances and redirection of strategic mission, the U.S. fiscal
environment has become more tenuous as the national debt and deficit continue to climb
and the effects of sequestration and a slowly recovering American economy continue to
severely restrict DoD spending. One of the main vehicles used for reallocating of DoD
resources was the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) of 2005 which birthed the
concept of joint basing.

Joint Basing
The 2005 BRAC was utilized as the system for the timely closure and realignment
of military installations inside the U.S (Department of Defense, 1990). The impetus for
this round of military base restructure was not only value creation through base closing
but transformation as intimated by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in a 2004 report to Congress,
“BRAC realignments will provide the flexibility to reconfigure forces to meet
new and emerging threats and to capitalize on emerging technologies. Further,
recognizing that military operations almost invariably involve multiple services,
BRAC 2005 will focus on opportunities to collocate forces from multiple services
in ways that enhance training and operational readiness.”
Department of Defense, (2004).

The idea of transformation manifested in the form of joint basing, which was
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labeled a priority for this round of base realignment (Defense, 2004). As a result, 12 joint
bases were created:
•

Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA: McChord Air Force Base (AFB) and Fort
Lewis.

•

Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ: Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst,
Fort Dix, and McGuire AFB.)

•

Joint Base Andrews- Naval Air Facility Washington, MD: Naval Air Facility
Washington and Andrews AFB.

•

Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, DC: Bolling AFB and Naval Station Anacostia.

•

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA: Henderson Hall (USMC) and Fort Myer.

•

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK: Fort Richardson and Elmendorf AFB.

•

Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI: Hickam AFB, HI, to Naval Station Pearl
Harbor, HI.

•

Joint Base San Antonio, TX: Fort Sam Houston, Randolph AFB, and Lackland
AFB.)

•

Joint Base Charleston, SC: Naval Weapons Station Charleston and Charleston
AFB.

•

Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: Fort Eustis and Langley AFB, VA.

•

Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, VA: Fort Story and Naval
Expeditionary Base Little Creek.

•

Joint Region Marianas, Guam: Andersen AFB and Naval Base Guam.
(Office of the Defense Under Secretary of Installations and Environment, (n.d.)
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In light of this move toward transformation, a study into the challenges of joint basing is
useful.
Problem Statement
The relatively brief history of joint basing coupled with its recency has led to a
gap in the academic literature regarding the topic. Little has been written on its
implementation challenges and issues even though many have experienced its effects.
This research attempts to provide insight into the challenges and issues of merging two
distinctly different bases with diverse mission sets into one functional joint base.
Research Focus
Current research zeroes in on the cost effectiveness of joint basing and leads to
conclusions of whether the decision saves the DoD dollars over time, and ultimately,
whether joint basing is a viable option for future BRACs. The context of this particular
study is that joint basing remains a current reality and it could be implemented again in
the future in order to achieve a greater degree of Service jointness. This may or may not
result in overall cost savings. An evaluation of all the joint bases that resulted from the
2005 BRAC would, no doubt, bear fruitfulness in highlighting the challenges that result
from base mergers; however this study is scoped to one Air Force led joint base. Even
though base consolidations have a wide variety of combinations between the
organizations being joined, especially in terms of mission, geographic location, Service
culture, personnel systems, and Service leads; the support functions (i.e. manpower,
logistics, security) share some common components that make the single base sample
generalizable and useful. The functions providing research data represent base support

4

functions vice operations (flying, training, fighting, etc.), since the impetus for joint
basing is consolidation of resources and support functions.
Investigative Questions
The concept of joint basing fundamentally veers away from the path that BRAC
has historically travelled; therefore it would be useful to study the issues inherent in the
process. The first area of concern is unity of publications and governing instructions
given that joint base lead Services bring the supported Service(s) into compliance with its
Service-specific instructions, regulations, and headquarters directives. Manpower is
another interesting topic as supported organizations under the coordination of the lead
Services follow differing staffing philosophies, especially with regards to civilian
manpower. Next, financial systems of joining bases may be problematic since working
capital funds could be converted to fully manned/funded operations and vice versa in
order to have a unified funding process. Finally, the organizational structure up and
down the chain of command could present some challenges as there is no “joint base in
the sky” to give full implementation direction to each joint base. Much of the decisionmaking falls on local joint base leadership with general guidance from the lead-Service
headquarters. The following investigative questions provide clarity to these curiosities:
IQ 1. What publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs,
and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?
IQ 2. What are the manpower challenges unique to joint basing?
IQ 3. What are the funding challenges, unique to joint basing, that have resulted in
mission impact?
IQ 4. How is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the
joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?
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Methodology
The primary data gathering method used in this research is the Delphi technique.
Much of the information regarding joint basing challenges resides in the experiences of
the personnel navigating its waters. A purely quantitative research method may provide
insight into a function’s performance, but it cannot necessarily capture the ranking of
issues. The Delphi method utilizes both a qualitative (questionnaire) and quantitative
(statistical analysis of answers) tool that leverages human intellect, opinion, and
experience as well as providing quantitative context for the data (Linstone & Turoff,
1975). The objects of the study include functional “experts” from the mission support
field, as identified by joint base leadership.
Assumptions/Limitations
The assumptions of this research are listed:
•

The panel of “experts” have adequate knowledge concerning joint basing
challenges to represent the opinions of their particular function in the
study

•

The results of the study are general enough to be generalizable to other
joint base constructs

•

Operational functions should not be considered for inclusion in the expert
panel due to the base support nature of the joint basing

•

The Delphi Study is an appropriate tool to unearth valuable insights into
joint base challenges

•

Future BRACs will consider expanding joint basing giving further utility
to this study

While it would be beneficial to study the implementation challenges of all twelve
joint bases, this study will be limited to one. This is due to the time constraints of the
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study and complexity. The narrow focus may not capture the entire complexity of
operations and may not be completely transportable to some joint base locations.

Implications
The results of this study will provide insight into the challenges of joint basing
with various benefits to stakeholders at different organizational level. First, the site
specific nature of the study will give an academically rigorous backing to joint base
installation resource gaps, whether personnel, funding, or assets. Also, the research will
validate the anecdotal information concerning the implementation challenges through the
lens of an iterative research methodology. From an academia perspective, the results of
the study will lead to generalizable results in the context of “business” mergers within the
Department of Defense. Lastly, and most far-reaching, a deep dive into the
implementation problems and issues from a construct as new as joint basing will provide
opportunities for focus and improvement for current joint bases and lessons learned
should the next round of BRAC include further base consolidations.
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II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature that addresses the
precursors to joint basing by analyzing the pre-2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) rounds, 2005 BRAC that led to joint basing, critiques of joint basing, and a
review of corporate merger findings. The BRAC rounds in the late 80’s and 90’s proved
to be a paradigm shift in the way the Department of Defense realized cost savings via
infrastructure cuts. The 2005 BRAC commission approved recommendations that were
much more far-reaching than previous base closure rounds and created the construct of
joint basing. In a non-governmental view, joint basing can be viewed as a corporate
merger; therefore a look into the corresponding literature on mergers and acquisitions is
warranted.
History of BRAC
Overview
The 2005 BRAC provides the backdrop for the purpose of this research; however
it is crucial to review previous BRAC rounds that set the precedent for military base
drawdown and consolidation. Before the idea of transformation via joint basing was
birthed in 2005, the burning platform of burgeoning military spending, changing political
climates, and shifting mission priorities resulted in drawdown of military installations
decades earlier. A look at BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 set the stage for
BRAC 2005 in which joint basing was created.
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Pre-BRAC Years
The pre-BRAC years, spanning the 1960’s to the late 1980’s, were marked by
distrust between Congress and the Department of Defense on the closure and realignment
of military installations. In the 1960’s, the DoD working in concert with the executive
branch, unilaterally closed 60 major military installations as part of the largest
restructuring in U.S. history (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The criteria for determining
which installations would be affected were established by the DoD in absence of
Congressional approval (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The political windfall resulting
from the closure and realignment program constrained Congress to enact legislation to
prevent the DoD from future restructuring efforts (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). President
Carter approved legislation in 1977 requiring future programs to take into account local
economic impacts along with environmental and strategic implications. This legislation
coupled with the Department of Defense requirement to give Congress advance notice of
any installation identified as a candidate for closure halted most attempts at changing the
military base infrastructure pre-BRAC (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). This stalemate
between the executive and legislative branch was broken in 1988 with the advent of the
Base Realignment and Closure commission.

1988 BRAC
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was commissioned on May 3, 1988 for
the purpose of recommending military installations for closure or realignment (Ribicoff
& Edwards, 1988). The goal of the 1988 BRAC was to reduce cost and improve the
national defense structure through improving military installation efficiency (Ribicoff &
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Edwards, 1988). In years previous to the 1988 commission, Congress prevented military
installation closures by requiring that any bases with more than 300 personnel be
approved by Congress with additional requirements to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The new legislation authorizing
base realignment and closure via an independent and bipartisan commission overruled the
decade-old way of direct Congressional approval and allowed the Department of Defense
to reevaluate the military value and cost effectiveness of its installations (Ribicoff &
Edwards, 1988). The military value factors, which became the basis for closure and
realignment for the 1988 BRAC, are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Military Value Factors and Physical Attributes:
Military Value Factors (1988 BRAC)
Mission Suitability
Availability of Facilities
Quality of Facilities
Quality of Life
Community Support
Adapted from Ribicoff & Edwards (1988).

The commission in consideration of the military value factors ultimately decided on 145
actions affecting military installations with 86 of those fully closing bases (Ribicoff &
Edwards, 1988). The 1988 BRAC was the template for further realignment and closure
efforts.
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1991 BRAC
The 1991 BRAC continued the multi-year installation realignment and closure
program by justifying drawdown on the basis of America’s post-Cold War status. A
focus for this round of BRAC was the reduction of domestic military bases. In total, 43
base closures and 28 realignments were approved by the commission promising savings
of $6.5 billion (Department of Defense, 1991). A force structure plan was submitted to
Congress assessing national security threats, addressing projected military end-strength in
light of the reduced Soviet threat, and substantiating the need for continued overseas
basing (Department of Defense, 1991). The criteria presented to Congress for installation
closure and realignments are presented below:
•

Military Value
o Current and future mission requirements
o Availability and condition of land, facilities, and airspace
o Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total
force requirements
o Cost and manpower implications

•

Return on Investment
o Extent and timing of potential costs and savings

•

Impacts
o Economic impacts on communities
o Ability of communities to support forces, missions, and personnel
(Department of Defense, 1991)
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1993 BRAC
The 1993 BRAC commission emphasized the declining Deparment of Defense
budget and across the board military manpower reductions as the burning platforms for
further installation closures and realignents (Department of Defense, 1993). Reduced
spending for oveseas military bases and reduction of the overseas military footprint were
emphasized as major vehicles for reinvestment in the U.S. (Department of Defense,
1993). The commission recommended 165 actions that included 31 major base closings
with projected savings of $3.1 billion (Department of Defense, 1993). The military value
criteria used in 1993 was almost identical to that of the 1991 BRAC with the one addition
of enviornmental impact (Department of Defense, 1993).

1995 BRAC
The impetus for BRAC ’95 was the thinking that Department of Defense
infrastructure should fall in line with the 1/3 reduction of military personnel over the
previous decade (Department of Defense, 1995). In the end, the 1995 commission
reduced continental U.S. infrastructure by 21% (146 installations closed or realigned)
with $4 billion promised in savings over the following six years (Department of Defense,
1995). The criteria for base closure and realignment remained the same in 1995 as
previous years; however the method of savings generation expanded to the closure of
Army, Navy, and DLA depots/shipyards along with reducing activity at the Air Force’s
Air Logistics Centers (Department of Defense, 1995).
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BRAC Impact 1988 to 1995
The Base Realignment and Closure construct busted the logjam of efforts to
reduce the domestic military infrastructure in the new post-Cold War era. This is
evidenced by the fact that only four bases were closed in the decade prior to the first
BRAC (Department of Defense, 1995). Figure 1 captures the cost savings of the BRAC
actions from 1988-1995.

Figure 1: BRAC Costs & Savings (Department of Defense, 1995).
The BRAC process resulted in the closure and realignment of hundreds of domestic DoD
installations and billions of dollars in savings. The 2005 BRAC process went further than
previous rounds by not only considering cost savings, but also military transformation.
BRAC 2005
Overview
The 2005 BRAC was unique amongst other rounds of closure and realignment, in
that, it not only sought to reduce military domestic infrastructure, but also transform the
way bases were administrated. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made it clear that this round
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of BRAC would focus on achieving a level of jointness in installation operation (Principi,
2005). The resulting recommendations by the Department of Defense were deemed
“more complex than “all four previous base closure rounds combined” (Principi, 2005).
A total of 190 recommendations were made by DoD with the independent commission
approving 119 outright and 45 others “with amendments” (Principi, 2005). Eight criteria
for closure and realignment were approved and are illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: 2005 BRAC Criteria (Principi, 2005).

The most compelling changes made in this round of BRAC was the idea of joint basing
Joint Basing
Recommendation #146 of the 2005 BRAC established 12 joint bases with the
purpose of consolidating base support functions and transferring installation management
responsibilities to a lead-Service (Principi, 2005). The criteria for determining the leadService (receiving installation) was derived from a military-value score, which evaluates
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the ability of an installation to “absorb new missions or provide surge capabilities”
(Principi, 2005). The final tally of Service-led bases:

•

2 Army-led
o Joint Base Lewis-McChord
o Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall

•

6 Air Force-led
o Joint Base McGuire-Dix- Lakehurst
o Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson
o Joint Base San Antonio
o Joint Base Charleston
o Joint Base Langley-Eustis
o Joint Base Andrews

•

4 Navy-led
o Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling
o Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
o Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story
o Joint Region Marianas
(Daniel, 2010)

A recommendation made by the BRAC commission was to create a common
language by which Services could measure their performance within the context of the
joint base (Principi, 2005). The Department of Defense’s response to this
recommendation manifested into common output level standards (COLS).
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Common Output Level Standards
DoDI 4001.01 defines COLS as
Output or performance level standards established by the Department of Defense
for installation support using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output
performance metrics, and cost drivers for each installation support function. These
standards provide a description of the capability associated with the particular
installation support function. Where appropriate, standards will be tiered to
provide options for managing risk. (Department of Defense, 2008).
A major transformation such as joint basing where a Service transfers installation
support responsibility to another Service requires some way to measure performance in
the form of cost savings and mission accomplishment. This would be impossible in the
absence of common terms and definitions for various types of installation support, thus
the COLS were born. The COLS break down to 11 program elements and 247 individual
standards. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the full list of program elements with the
corresponding number of subcategorized standards over the last three fiscal years along
with a subset of specific standards, respectively.
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Figure 3: Program Elements & COLS (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014)
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Figure 4: Logistics Support COLS Example (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014)

In reference to Figure 3, the Base Support Vehicles & Equipment function involves
providing vehicles and equipment (without and/or without an operator), vehicle
maintenance services, and transportation services (Joint Basing Installation Support,
2014). In this specific case, the vehicle support function is defined along with a standard
service level for all joint bases. While the COLS support the vision of jointness in BRAC
2005 in terms of improved performance as a goal, the main driver for joint basing, and
the reason for this and previous BRAC commissions, was cost savings. It is important to
review the literature for an analysis on joint base cost savings.
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Joint Basing Cost
Overview
If the main driver of BRAC is to increase the efficiency of domestic military
installations in order to maximize value to the taxpayer, then it is appropriate to compare
the original promise of BRAC 2005 cost savings with cost savings actually realized in the
literature, especially with regard to the phenomena of joint basing. The Department of
Defense claimed that $47.8 billion would be saved as a result of the 2005 BRAC
(Principi, 2005). An analysis of that claim is given in the next sections.

2005 BRAC Commission Critique
The 2005 BRAC commission discounted and revised the DoD’s original cost
savings projection to be gained as a result of base closures, realignments, and joint basing
claiming that the $47.8 billion in savings was actually closer to $15 billion over 20 years
(Principi, 2005). The commission felt that the military manpower savings factor
calculated by the Department, which was calculated based on the reassignment of over
26,000 military personnel, would not translate to actual cost savings (Principi, 2005).
The commission claimed that, in absence of actually cutting these positions, real savings
could not be achieved even though military effectiveness would increase due to personnel
being reassigned to higher priority missions (Principi, 2005). If the military manpower
savings due to reassignment versus elimination are not realized, the one-time upfront cost
estimation of $21 billion significantly reduces the cost savings claims (Principi, 2005).
While this critique was written pre-BRAC, it would be interesting to review the analysis
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by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with regard to post-BRAC cost
analysis.

GAO Critique on Joint Basing Cost Savings
A summary of GAO reports evaluating joint basing cost savings is given:
•

Joint basing projected cost savings are not validated since they derived from a
formula rather than through deliberations of commanders in the field and in
absence of actual manpower studies (Government Accountability Office, 2007)

•

The personnel requirements for joint basing are difficult to surmise, thus making
it equally difficult to estimate accurate cost savings. Projected cost savings are
estimated at 58% less than original projections (Government Accountability
Office, 2007)

•

Joint basing implementation efforts actually decreased the originally projected
annual net savings by $84 million which was the largest decrease for any of the
2005 BRAC recommendations (Government Accountability Office, 2009)

•

New joint basing standards require some installation service level areas to
actually increase from pre-BRAC levels as a result of increased administration
costs and loss of efficiencies (Government Accountability Office, 2009)

A more recent GAO report regarding joint basing written in 2012 addressed joint basing
efficiencies to a greater depth than before. GAO claimed that joint basing savings
projections had dropped off by 90% and that the DoD lacked a method to effectively
track cost savings (Government Accountability Office, 2012). In the report, GAO

20

concluded that the newly formed joint bases would cost more joined than as separate
installations (Government Accountability Office, 2012). The GAO directly challenged
the COLS as an effective method, in its current form, to provide a common framework
for installation support since reporting of the standards were, in some cases, Servicespecific and not common at all (Government Accountability Office, 2012). Additionally,
some definitions of support standards were still deemed unclear (Government
Accountability Office, 2012). As follow-on, the GAO identified joint basing as a “high
risk” area due to DoD official’s lack of a reliable implementation plan to achieve cost
savings (Government Accountability Office, 2013). According to GAO,
In regard to joint basing, DOD has established 12 joint bases. However, DOD has
not developed (1) an implementation plan to guide joint bases in achieving
anticipated cost savings and efficiencies goals, (2) a reliable method of collecting
information on the net costs or estimated savings and efficiencies, (3) a consistent
interpretation and reported use of the common standards by the joint bases, (4) a
process to prioritize the review and identify potential revision of those standards,
(5) a communication strategy to meet the needs of joint base officials, and (6)
guidance to the joint bases on developing training materials to be used to inform
incoming personnel about the specifics of how installation services are provided
on joint bases. (Government Accountability Office, 2013).
The report concludes that the promise of an immediate payback period on joint basing
upfront costs had not been honored by the DoD based on the commissions original report
(Government Accountability Office, 2013).

Mergers
Overview
The joining of bases can be viewed in terms of corporate mergers. It is important
to distinguish between mergers and acquisitions since both are sometimes used
interchangeably; however the differences are important. An acquisition is the case of one
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organization subsuming another by transferring the assets; thereby maintaining the
original identify of the acquiring firm. (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). A merger,
on the other hand, is defined as two or more firms joining to form a brand new entity
(Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). One could argue that, in the case of joint basing,
one installation is acquiring the other’s assets and personnel and define the joining
together as an acquisition. In another vein, one could make the argument that the
Services are merging at the installation level to form a unique entity as is the case of
mergers. Whether by merger or acquisition, it would be fruitful to review the literature of
mergers to understand more about joint basing.

People Considerations in Mergers
In a 2005 case study, Ullrich discovers that among two merging firms, the
employees attributed significant value to the strong culture of their pre-merger
organization and placed value in identifying as one of its members. This is an interesting
parallel to joint basing since each military Service exhibits its own unique organizational
culture. In the case study, members of the merging organizations reacted negatively to
the loss of organizational identification due to the fast-paced nature of the merger
(Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). Ullrich (2005) points to structural and procedural
uncertainty as the general category of feelings experienced by merging employees in the
new organization, such as the difficulty in knowing who to contact for vital information,
the challenges presented by additional levels of bureaucracy, and the fear of an unclear
future. In addition to uncertainty, merging employees struggled with the general category
of symbols and symbolic actions from the top (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).
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Symbols were described as instances of one firm being underrepresented in key premerger leadership meetings or not identifying with the merged firm’s new logo (Ullrich,
Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). Symbolic actions from the top were characterized as
distrust of the new CEO who, in the case study, demanded more cost-saving, but also
held meetings in locations that were seen as exorbitant in cost (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van
Dick, 2005). Table 2 summarizes the discontinuity employees experienced by way of
uncertainty and symbolism.

Table 2: Themes of Uncertainty and Symbols Found in Merging Organizations

(Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005)
A quote from employees in Ulrrich’s case study (2005) sums up their
recommendations for implementation of the merger, “During the implementation of the
new structure it felt like one was trying to shorten a pregnancy from nine to two months.
Of course we are unsatisfied with the result, but now it is too late.”

Stepfamily Metaphor
The step-family view of corporate mergers refers to the study of sociology; in
that, corporations are much like families with mergers being akin to marriages (Allred,
Boal, & Holstein, 2005). This seems to fit in a joint basing context since the different
military Services are like families who are quite different in the way they conduct
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business. Corporations, like the military Services, have their own culture, hierarchies,
and interrelationships (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Corporations are like to families
since they are not static, but dynamic with different members taking on certain roles
(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). In the context of merger and acquisition, the acquired
company takes on the role as the stepchild and is subordinated to its new corporate family
(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Despite the situation where both corporate families are
seen as equals, a dominant firm typically emerges (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). In
the joint basing case, the supported Service could be seen as the acquired firm, since the
supported service transfers installation support to the lead-Service. In this case, the
supported Service is the stepchild of the lead Service in the new military family. The
same consequences (shock and high stress levels) that family members experience in the
course of joining a new family are much the same as in mergers and acquisitions (Allred,
Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Some of the issues that need to be resolved in a merger, much
like a remarriage, are high failure rates and boundary problems (Allred, Boal, & Holstein,
2005). Table 3 summarizes these points.

Table 3: Similarities Between Stepfamilies and Corporations Engaged in M&A Activity

(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005).
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According to Allred, Boal, & Hostein (2005), the success of a merger is influenced by the
following factors:
•

Dissimilarity in things like culture, management style, and organizational
structure

•

Problem children in the form of behavior problems like acting out, sabotage,
providing misinformation

•

Commitment such as viewing the corporate merger as non-permanent
(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005)

Stepfamily Metaphor Summary
The step-family metaphor seems reasonable in explaining why mergers and
acquisitions are difficult to successfully complete. In terms of the joint basing
application, it is interesting to think of the lead-Service installations as subordinating the
supported Service installations in a stepfamily type of relationship.

Post-Merger Integration
A study into post-merger integration yields some insight concerning the process
by which firms, or military installations in the case of joint basing, become one entity. It
is estimated that a half to two-thirds of mergers fail due to poor integration (Shrivastava,
1986). Integrating activities include:
•

Coordinating activities

•

Monitoring and controlling departmental activities
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•

Resolving departmental conflicts
(Shrivastava, 1986)

Why is integration necessary? Shrivastava (1986) explains, “Integration is necessary
because large formal organizations operate through functionally different departments
that perform a narrow set of specialized tasks.” Integration is a complex process that is
influenced by variables such as the firm’s environment and size (Shrivastava, 1986).
Firms have trouble integrating due to having their own unique systems and procedures
and personnel show resistance to adopting a new way of doing things (Shrivastava,
1986). Shrivastava recognizes 3 types of post-merger integration, namely, Procedural,
Physical, and Managerial & Sociocultural (Shrivastava, 1986). Procedural integration
refers to combining systems and procedures in order to standardize work at various
levels, including legal entities, accounting systems, and strategic business unit (profit
center) (Shrivastava, 1986). Physical integration involves bringing together product
lines, product technological systems, and immovable real estate (Shrivastava, 1986).
Finally, Managerial & Sociocultural integration references the most difficult of tasks such
as changes to the organizational structure, transferring personnel, maintaining morale and
keeping employees motivated (Shrivastava, 1986). Shrivastava (1986) contends that a
phased approach to integration is best and causes the least disruption to the merging firms
and that particular attention should be paid the sociocultural aspects since they are the
most difficult to integrate (Shrivastava, 1986).
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III. Methodology

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to review the methodology utilized in the research.
The primary method by which insights were gathered on joint basing challenges was the
Delphi Method. The Delphi Method was developed by the RAND Corporation in the
early 1950’s and utilizes expert opinion to obtain consensus on a topic (Linstone &
Turoff, 1975). Expert opinion was necessary in this study given the lack of available data
necessary to answer the investigative questions. The Delphi Method is particularly
helpful when the researcher must use expert opinion as the sole source of information
(Cuhls, 2003). It is difficult to determine a specific metric that would point the
researcher, unequivocally, toward the challenges of joint basing. There is no shortage of
manpower, financial, and mission data to analyze; however, it is choosing the correct one
at the exclusion of others that would make a metrics approach arbitrary at best.
Additionally, choosing the correct metric is only feasible when the research problem is
clearly understood. In this case, the Delphi Method does a good job of helping
researchers understand a problem more clearly (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).
The best approach, and the one used in this research, was to gather a cross-functional
panel of joint basing experts with the purpose of generating the appropriate data as part of
a Delphi Study.
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Method Overview
The Delphi Method operates under the assumption that “two heads are better than
one” or in the case of an expert panel, n-heads are better than one (Dalkey, 1969). It was
so-named after a Greek oracle from the city of Delphi in Greece. An oracle was someone
who was known for substantial wisdom and knowledge, especially in the realm of
prophesies (Yousuf, 2007). In this study, the panel of experts functions as “oracles” by
leveraging a high level of expertise on the subject of joint basing implementation. The
panel of experts interacts with the researcher in a systematic process through the use of
questionnaires (Yousuf, 2007). One may question the use of opinion in a study, so it is
useful to understand where it lies on the spectrum of validation. Opinion lies in the
middle of the scale in terms of the kinds of information a researcher can gather. On the
outer extremes are knowledge and speculation where there is a great deal of evidence on
a subject and where is little or no evidence supporting a claim, respectively (Dalkey,
1969). It is in this middle area where the Delphi Method generates data. The bedrock by
which opinion becomes the basis for understanding of a subject is anonymity, iteration,
controlled feedback, and statistical analysis (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).

Anonymity
One of the features of the Delphi Method is its use of a panel of experts who are
anonymous. Panel members are truly anonymous when they can freely express their
opinions in the absence of group pressure, where ideas are judged on their quality rather
than their source (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This is especially important in
the context of a hierarchical type organization like the Department of Defense. In such
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an environment, panel members’ unique contributions could be lost through conformity
(Ogden, Carter, & Monczka, 2005). In the study, panelists’ identities were kept
anonymous by the use of questionnaires vice face-to-face interaction. The questionnaire
allows the researcher to act as the facilitator without the physical presence of the panel
members (Yousuf, 2007).

Panel Qualifications
The term “expert” should be qualified to some extent in order to validate the
expressed opinions. The criteria used to determine expertise was:
•

Knowledge and experience with the topic

•

Capacity and willingness to participate

•

Sufficient time to participate through the duration of the study

•

Effective communication skills
(Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007)

The panel’s knowledge and experience with the topic of joint basing proved strong with a
combined 93 years of joint basing experience and 474 years of functional experience.
Each expert had an average four years of joint basing experience and 20 years of
functional experience. Though four years of joint basing experience may appear low, as
of this writing, joint basing was only six years removed from implementation.
Additionally, panelists were identified by their commanders and/or directors as the
resident joint basing experts at their installation. In terms of functional representation,
the panel spanned Logistics, Force Support, Security Forces, Civil Engineering, and
Command Staff.

In addressing capacity and willingness to participate, all of the
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panelists volunteered to take part in the study. The tenor of the survey comments suggest
that panelists were particularly interested in the topic at hand and were motivated to give
their opinion. Potential panelists were notified of the time commitment in advance as a
precondition for their participation. The effective communication aspect of the screening
process was relatively easy to achieve since panelists represented senior level managers
at their installation and require requisite communication skills for their position and
grade. The grade breakdown for the initial panel with quantity is illustrated in Table 4.
Table 4: Panel Grade Breakdown
Military Officer

Military Enlisted

GS Civilian

O-3 (1)

E-7 (1)

GS-11 (4)

O-4 (2)

E-8 (1)

GS-12 (4)

O-5 (2)

E-9 (1)

GS-13 (5)

WS Civilian
WS-14 (1)

GS-14 (1)

With regard to the chosen number of panelists, between five and 30 yields the best results
(Ogden, Carter, & Monczka, 2005).

Panel Demographics
The heterogeneous or homogenous nature of the sample of panelists is an
important consideration that will, ultimately, drive the number of panelists upwards or
downwards, respectively. A homogenous group allows for a smaller panel of 10-15
people while a heterogeneous panel may require more (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn,
2007). The researcher felt that the cross-functional nature of the panel merited a larger
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sample, so 29 potential participants were initially invited to join the study. Ultimately, 23
panelists agreed to participate. The difficulty of surveying experts in a field is that they
are often very busy which could lead to survey attrition (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn,
2007). Attrition is also realized since, as the study moves to later rounds, more effort is
required and response rate drops off (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).
Iteration and Controlled Feedback
Rounds
The Delphi Method is characterized by iteration, in that; panelists are allowed to
refine their inputs in reaction to other group members’ feedback (Skulmoski, Hartman, &
Krahn, 2007). The panelists’ input is received in several rounds with a summary of
results given from the previous round in order to move toward consensus (Dalkey, 1969).
This study was designed with the intention of executing the process in three to fourrounds; which is typically sufficient for most research (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn,
2007). The rounds were conducted by formal questionnaire.

Method of Interaction
Delphi studies have typically been conducted by paper or electronic means
(Cuhls, 2003). Use of electronic means vice paper aids in keeping panelists engaged and
motivated due to the quicker turnarounds of information (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn,
2007). The geographic separation of the researcher and panel members necessitated an
electronic questionnaire via website and email. The internet questionnaire and email
(blind courtesy copy and one-on-one emailing) also helped achieve the aforementioned
anonymity between the panelists.
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Initial Questionnaire
The first questionnaire contained one open-ended question for the panelists to
answer in order to elicit unconstrained response and ideas (Skulmoski, Hartman, &
Krahn, 2007). The panelists should be encouraged to list as many items as necessary
(Schmidt, 1997). Though an open-ended question, as opposed to a focus question, is
more time-consuming, it is important for the researcher to not lead the panel of experts to
any conclusions (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The open-ended question was
stated as such:
•

What are the challenges of joint basing, either specific to your functional
area or in general? Please expound on your thoughts and provide
examples as necessary. Please provide a minimum of 3 challenges. There
is no maximum.

The initial questionnaire was designed to validate the investigative questions, namely:
IQ 1. What publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs,
and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?
IQ 2. What are the manpower challenges unique to joint basing?
IQ 3. What are the funding challenges, unique to joint basing, that have resulted in
mission impact?
IQ 4. How is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the
joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?
The open-ended question design is an important aspect of this first step since panel
Members can become frustrated or fail to give a meaningful response if the question is
vague or confusing (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The initial question was
defined with the help of the research sponsor in order to avoid this pitfall.
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Categorization Validation
Once the panel of experts answered the broad question, the researcher conducted
an analysis of the answers. The outcome of this analysis was a categorization of themes
and the removal and/or consolidation of redundant answers (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).
In this joint basing study, it was the researcher’s intention to have the respondents rank
the categorized items. In order to achieve this, the list was pared down to achieve a
meaningful ranking (Schmidt, 1997). An important step before proceeding to the next
questionnaire (in which the panelists rank the pared list), required the researcher to
request feedback from the respondents regarding the categorization, or else it cannot be
claimed that a valid list resulted (Schmidt, 1997). Panelists were given the opportunity to
clarify their comments and opinions or expand their answers (Skulmoski, Hartman, &
Krahn, 2007). This was accomplished by emailing the panelists their comments and the
correlating categorization. The respondent was given the opportunity to either accept or
reject the categorization. If rejected, the researcher would require feedback to
appropriately re-categorize the item. In this study, all of the panelists agreed with the
schema.
Paring the List of Issues
After validating the veracity of categorized responses, the researcher examined
the list to determine if an appropriate number of items remained for the panelists to
consider. A list of 20 or less items is considered workable for a panel going into the next
round (Schmidt, 1997). It is important to note that the researcher should not take it upon
himself to decide the top issues from the comprehensive list. This task should be left up
to the panel of experts (Schmidt, 1997). A good rule of thumb in selecting the top items
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is to keep only those selected by a simple majority of the panel (Okoli & Pawlowski,
2004). After a reasonable number of items are agreed upon, the group can move to the
next phase. An example of the process is illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Delphi study administration process (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004)

Ranking
The consolidated, categorized, and validated list agreed upon by the panel was
ranked in subsequent rounds. The decision to press on with an additional round or to stop
the polling is an important one. If too few rounds are executed, the result may not be
significant while too many rounds may lead to a greater level of panelist attrition
(Schmidt, 1997). According to Skulmoski (2007), a good stopping point is reached when
the panel achieves consensus. The panelists are asked to rank the final list of items,
which should be distributed randomly to avoid order bias (Schmidt, 1997). The
individual joint base challenges were alphabetized in the rank-order questionnaire to
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avoid this bias. The idea of controlled feedback was woven throughout this process.
Panelists ranked and re-ranked items in subsequent rounds with input from the entire
panel until consensus was reached. The power of the Delphi Method comes into play
here since it is more difficult to achieve consensus through direct interaction than through
anonymous survey iteration (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). An example of the second
questionnaire, asking the respondents to rank the issues, is illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Ranking Questionnaire Example
Comments were integral in latter rounds to justify an expert’s ranking and aided in
timelier consensus (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Joint basing panelists were given the
opportunity to justify and/or explain their ranking via a comment box on the online
survey instrument. The use of statistical analysis is integral in the feedback loop to the
expert panel and in deciding when an adequate level of consensus is reached.
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Statistical Analysis
Overview
Statistical group response of the experts’ opinions ensured that every individual
opinion was represented in the final result (Pill, 1971). The aggregated individual
opinions minimized the biasing of dominant panelists and ensured opinions were not
unduly influenced (Dalkey, 1969). Additionally, statistical analysis provided an avenue
for the researcher to know when to halt the study (Schmidt, 1997). The primary methods
used in the research to achieve these ends were the Kendall’s W and Response DataBased Weighted Mean method.

Kendall’s W Coefficient of Concordance
Since the ultimate goal of the iterative ranking was for the panelist to achieve
consensus, an objective measure was used to determine at which point consensus is
achieved. Kendall’s W Coefficient of Concordance was the measure utilized in this study
to determine the stopping point of the rounds. Kendall’s W is considered the best
statistical measure of non-parametric rankings (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). This method
utilizes a least-squares solution to measure expert agreement and provides a comparative
way to measure concordance round-to-round (Schmidt, 1997). Schmidt (1997) points out
that it is a relatively simple measure that is easy to understand, making it a great fit for a
Delphi Study. The range of values produced by Kendall is between 0 and 1 with the
former signifying little to no agreement and the later representing perfect concordance
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). The range of values and their corresponding meanings are
illustrated in Table 5.
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Table 5: Interpretation of Kendall’s W:
W

Interpretation

Confidence in Ranks

.1

Very weak agreement

None

.3

Weak agreement

Low

.5

Moderate agreement

Fair

.7

Strong agreement

High

.9

Unusually strong agreement

Very High

Adapted from Schmidt (1997).

Once Kendall’s W value reaches .7, then the panel ceased iterating the rankings as a
satisfactory level of consensus had been reached (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). In the case
of a W value falling below the threshold, the feedback was sent to the panelists and the
next round began, unless the value leveled off or the experts no longer wished to
participate in future rounds (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Even in the case of relatively
low values of W, the results could still yield statistical significance if the panel is large
enough relative to the population (Schmidt, 1997). In this study, the panel members
represented a large majority of the joint basing experts at the installation being observed.
According to Kendall (1990), the Coefficient of Concordance is calculated by the
following formula:
W=

12 S
m ( n 3 − n)
2

Where S = sum of square deviations of the rankings
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n = the number of objects ranked
m = the number of judges
The more the experts agree with one another on the ranks, the bigger the deviations
become, and as a result, the coefficient gets larger (Kendall & Gibbons, 1990). Another
measure utilized in the study was the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean method.

Response Data-Based Weighted Mean Method
While Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance is the quantitative measure of
consensus for this study, a method was necessary to determine the final group rankings
from each round. This was accomplished by way of the Response Data-Based Weighted
Mean method. This method is necessary when the researcher believes that the degree of
disagreement should be factored into the overall measure and it is especially robust in
minimizing the effect of data outliers (Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 2002). When
compared to an on-weighted mean, as is typical in a Delphi Study, this particular method
reduces mean absolute percentage error by a greater amount (Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker,
2002). The formula for the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean:

 X ij − UNWMEAN xi 
DIST=
xij
In this first step, the absolute distance between each response and the associated unweighted mean (arithmetic mean) is taken, where:
X ij = a particular response, j (rank) in a particular group, i (item among the list of items)
Next, a weight is computed for each response (individual rank), where parameter α
corrects for systemic error (reference value of 1):

39

  ni

  ∑ DISTxij  
j =1

WEIGHTxij =  
 DISTxij 





α

Finally, the weighted mean is measured, penalizing or rewarding panel members,
depending on the distance of their response to the un-weighted group mean:
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This approach to determining group ranking from each round typically revolves around
the median and standard deviation. However the median is a poor measure of central
tendency when the dispersion is large (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).

Statistical Analysis in Controlled Feedback
Schmidt (2007) contends that more than just the mean (or in this case, the
weighted-mean), should be communicated to the panel of experts at the beginning of each
round. The other important feedback points are the Kendall’s W and any comments from
the previous round that justify a ranking (Schmidt, 1997). The researcher communicated
the weighted-mean and the Coefficient of Concordance along with comments in the latter
rounds of the Delphi Study via email.

Limitations of the Delphi Method
One of the risks, among many, of utilizing a panel of expert methodology is the
potential diluting of the foremost experts in a group by aggregating the opinion (Pill,
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1971). There is a tradeoff between interviewing one or two experts, thereby, potentially
missing out on certain insights that others might have and increasing the panel to the
point of dilution (Pill, 1971). The researcher decided that it was far more harmful to
utilize interviews in order to unearth joint basing challenges given the cross-functional
nature of the installation. Another limitation is that this method is time-consuming
compared to other methods and could suffer panelist attrition (Hsu, 2007). Despite these
limitations, the Delphi Study is widely accepted as the method of choice when dealing
with imperfect or insufficient knowledge in a particular area (Skulmoski, Hartman, &
Krahn, 2007). This certainly applies to the murky environment of joint basing where
functional biases and the newness of the phenomenon have hindered rather than helped
bring the real issues to light.

Summary
The Delphi Method proved to be an appropriate way to generate data in
determining the implementation challenges of joint basing. The relatively new nature of
this basing construct required the bringing together of the foremost experts to generate
the issues and rank them in a meaningful way. An anonymous, iterative approach to
surveying works well in a vertical organization like the Department of Defense.
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IV. Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to communicate the results of the joint basing
Delphi Study. The Delphi Method was utilized to elicit the opinions of a panel of experts
who possessed intimate knowledge and experience concerning joint basing
implementation. Specifically, the panel was asked to brainstorm the top challenges of
joint basing implementation and then participate in an iterative ranking of the issues until
a final ranking was achieved. In the following sections, the researcher will present the
results of the study and connect the results to the original investigative questions.
Results of Delphi Study
Panel Selection
The researcher selected the panel based on inputs from top managers and leaders
in the targeted functional areas. Leaders were asked to identify those within their areas
with the most breadth and depth of experience regarding joint basing implementation. In
coordination with the research sponsor, the following functional areas were targeted:
•

Logistics (transportation, supply, aircraft fuels, vehicle management)

•

Force Support (manpower & personnel, food & recreation, family care
programs)

•

Security Forces (force protection, armory, crime prevention
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•

Command Staff (safety, plans, legal, inspector general, joint base business
office)

•

Civil Engineering (base infrastructure management, emergency
management, facility management)
(Department of the Air Force, 2011)

Potential panelists were contacted via email to request their participation in the study.
They were informed that the study would require a commitment of three to four weeks of
availability and that it would be conducted mainly via email and via an online survey
tool. Ultimately, the study lasted for four weeks. The researcher initially identified and
contacted 29 potential panelists. The breakdown of panelists contacted by functional area
is shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Request for Panelists by Functional Area

The researcher prepared a brainstorming round so that the panel could identify the joint
basing implementation challenges to be ranked later in the study.

Round One: Brainstorming
The expert panel was asked to brainstorm the top joint basing implementation
challenges. The online survey was open for seven calendar days with 23/29 panelists
responding resulting in a 77% response rate. The panelists were given one open-ended
question and were encouraged to respond with their top joint basing implementation
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challenges. The question called for a minimum of three different joint basing challenges
with no maximum. The resulting panel of 23 members spanned all of the targeted
functions and is shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Round 1 Panelists by Functional Area

Round One: Coding and Categorization
The panel contributed 106 individual joint base challenges in the brainstorming
round (see Appendix A). It was then incumbent on the researcher to pare down the list to
less than 20 individual challenges for the panel to rank (Schmidt, 1997). Table 8
summarizes the contributions of the panelists by number of issues and functional area:

Table 8: Round 1 Contribution of Issues by Functional Area

The categorization effort consisting of consolidation of themes resulted in a list of 30
issues as illustrated in Table 9. They are presented in no particular order.
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Table 9: Categorized Listing of Issues from Round 1

An example of the categorization effort is shown in Table 10. In this particular
categorization, four separate statements were consolidated under ‘Budget Cuts’. In terms
of contribution to this category, two Logistics experts, one Command Staff and one Force
Support panelist gave input under the Budget Cuts heading. The bolded print represents
key information that the researcher keyed in on to make the coding decision.
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Table 10: Budget Cuts Coding

The entire list of categorized challenges is given in Appendix A. After categorization of
the issues was accomplished, the researcher sent the categorized issues back to the
panelists for validation that the essence of their input was accurately interpreted.
Panelists were given four days to respond with 20/23 panelists responding. All
responding panelists agreed with the classification schema.

Round One: Paring Down the List
The resulting list of 30 issues was still too many for the panel to effectively rank.
The researcher considered two different ways to reduce the list to a level below 20 total
issues. The first method focused on the number of mentions by category. In this schema,
the number of mentions could include the same panelists pointing out an issue more than
one time in their survey response. The results are given in Table 11.

46

Table 11: Categories by Number of Times Mentioned and Functional Area

The second method disregarded multiple mentions of a single issue by a single panel
member and focused on the number of panelists that addressed the same issue. The result
is given in table 12.
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Table 12: Categories by Number of Individual Panelist Mention

Since the object of the Delphi Study is to achieve a level of consensus, the researcher
chose the second method. The researcher started eliminating categories from the list by
taking out issues that were mentioned only once or twice until a manageable list was left.
In the end, 13 issues were identified as illustrated in Table 13.
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Table13: Resulting Round One List of Challenges

The list of 13 items provided the basis for the next round of the Delphi Study in which
the panel of experts ranked the issues.

Round 2: Ranking the Issues
With the issues identified, the panel was given the opportunity to rank the issues
from 1-13, with one being the most impacting issue of joint base implementation and 13
representing least impacting. The survey was open for three calendar days with 20/23
panelists responding for an 87% response rate. Table 14 breaks down the respondents by
functional area.

Table 14: Round 2 Panelists by Functional Area
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The respondent’s anonymity was maintained by way of an internet questionnaire.
Panelists were given the opportunity to rank the 13 items, which were presented in
alphabetical order, and invited the panelists to provide any comments via a comment box.
Figure 7 depicts the survey along with descriptions of each issue. The descriptions were
based on the initial round one responses.

Figure 7: Round 2 Questionnaire

50

The results of panelists’ ranks are shown in Table 15 in two parts with the following
identification schema:
•

L = Logistics

•

F = Force Support

•

S = Security Forces

•

C = Civil Engineering

•

CS = Command Staff

Table 15: Round 2 Rankings
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Table 15: Round 2 Rankings (con’t)

Round 2: Ranking Analysis
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance was computed to determine the level of
round one consensus. Once again, values closer to .1 signify weak agreement and values
closer to .7 represent very strong agreement. Utilizing Kendall’s method, the round 2
resulting value was .15 with a corresponding p-value of >.001 (statistically significant at
the .05 level); therefore, more rounds were needed to move toward consensus. The
Response Data-Weighted Mean Method (WDM) was computed in order to generate the
final group ranking for round two. The results of the round two ranking are given in
Table 16.
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Table 16: Round 2 Weighted Mean Group Ranking

The consensus level value and the final group ranking for round two were utilized as the
foundation of round three.

Round 3: Controlled Feedback
The panel of experts was given the opportunity to improve upon their individual
rankings by the controlled feedback process. The researcher conveyed to each panelist
via email their individual rankings from the previous round (round two) and the final
group rankings. The round three questionnaire was open for five days with 17/20
panelists responding achieving an 85% response rate. A breakdown of the round three
panelists by functional area is given in Table 17.

Table 17: Round 3 Panelists by Functional Area
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Once again, the panelists were asked to re-rank the issues, 1-13, in light of the group
ranking. The researcher also offered the opportunity for panelists to give comments on
their ranking, especially if it significantly differed from the group ranking. The order of
the items on the questionnaire was initially given in the group ranking order and panelists
were given instructions to re-rank the issues. The next round questionnaire is provided in
Figure 8.

Figure 8: Round 3 Questionnaire
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Round 3: Ranking the Issues
To maintain continuity, panelists’ original designations were maintained. For
example, a panelist labeled ‘L-2’ in the previous round kept the same label throughout
the study. If ‘L-1’ were to drop out of the next round, then the panelist identified as ‘L2’ would still keep the same designation and not be re-named ‘L-1’. The results of the
round three ranking by individual panelist are given in Table 18.

Table 18: Round 3 Rankings
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Ranking Analysis
The consensus value for round three improved to .38 with a corresponding pvalue of >.001, which is significant at the .05 level. Since the consensus value did not
approach the .7 level of strong agreement, another round of rankings was required. The
weighted-mean method produced a round three group ranking that was different than the
round two ranking. Table 19 illustrates this point.

Table 19: Round 3 Weighted Mean Group Ranking

The biggest movers in terms of rank among the issues from round two to three were:
•

Lack of true jointness in adopting “best” policies and procedures (7 spots)

•

Lack of a joint base manpower standard (7 spots)

•

Perceived subordination to Lead Service (6 spots)

•

Incompatible Service Finance Methods (5 spots)

The panelists were prepped for round four given the results of the round three consensus
value.
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Round 4: Controlled Feedback
As preparation for round four, the panelists were given their individual rankings
and the round three group ranking as comparison points. Two other pieces of feedback
were given to the panel, namely, the consensus value from the previous round and any
issues in which they were statistically different than the group ranking. The statistical
difference was determined by calculating the inter-quartile ranges (IQR) of the ranks for
each issue. If panelists were outside of the IQR for a particular item, the researcher
pointed it out as a statistical outlier for consideration in the re-ranking. The ranges and
results are given in Tables 20 and 21 with the shaded regions in Table 21 representing
ranks that were statistical outliers.
Table 20: Inter-quartile Ranges
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Table 21: Statistical Outliers of Round 3 Rankings

The round four questionnaire was open for four days with 15/17 panelists responding
resulting in an 88% response rate. Table 22 illustrates the round 4 panel make-up
according to functional area.

Table 22: Round 4 Panelists by Functional Area
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The survey presented the rankings in the order of the group ranking from round three.
Panelists were encouraged to consider the group rankings in their assessment of the
issues. Round four questionnaire is illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Round 4 Questionnaire
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Round 4: Ranking the Issues
The results of the round 4 rankings are given in Table 23.
Table 23: Round 4 Rankings

Round 4: Ranking Analysis
Kendall’s W for this round was calculated at .63 with a corresponding p-value of
>.001 which is significant at the .05 level. At this point, the researcher decided to end the
study and forgo any further rounds of ranking for two reasons. First, the consensus value
of .63 is near enough .7 (strong agreement) to warrant satisfaction with the round four
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group ranking. The other reason to end the study was due to panelist survey fatigue and
round-to-round panel attrition. Thus, the round four group ranking represented the final
ranking of issues for the study. The final group ranking using the weighted-mean method
is represented in Table 24.

Table 24: Final Ranking of Joint Base Challenges

The most significant changes in these rankings from the previous round are:
•

Lack of true jointness in adopting “best” policies and procedures (9 spots)

•

Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly (6 spots)

Summary of Analysis
The panel of experts successfully generated a list of issues regarding joint basing,
ranked those issues through several rounds of controlled feedback, and ultimately, came
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to consensus on the order of the top 13 issues. The final consensus value of .63 gives a
strong indication that the final ranking of issues is a good representation of reality.
Investigative Questions Answered
Given the results of the Delphi Study, it is useful to reference the original research
questions to determine if they have been appropriately addressed and answered.
IQ 1.
Do publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, and/or other
mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?
Publication conflicts most certainly exist within the joint base construct. This issue was
generated by the panel of experts and ranked as the #3 issue on the final list of 13 top joint
basing issues (difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure).
IQ 2.
Are there manpower challenges unique to joint basing?
Manpower challenges were identified in the brainstorming round of this study and were
agreed upon as the #6 joint basing issue (lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard). The
answer to this question is undoubtedly “yes”.
IQ 3.
Are there significant funding challenges unique to joint basing that have resulted in mission
impact?
Funding challenges were identified by the panel and ranked as the #1 issue of joint basing
implementation (budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs).
IQ 4.
Is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the joint base,
conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?
The difficulties of joint base organizational structure were addressed in a couple of ranked
issues, namely, #2 (difficulty merging organizational structures) and #11 (multiple chains of
command create duplication of effort/costly).

62

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
The researcher, via the Delphi Study methodology, set out to illuminate the
specific implementation challenges of joint basing. Joint basing is a relatively new
military installation support phenomenon and much needed to be learned in terms of the
effective merging of Department of Defense organizations. The information gained in
this study, namely, the full list of top challenges, the pared-down list, and the final rankordered list provided some context to the difficulty military organizations can experience
when merging.
The original list of 30 joint basing challenges generated by the panel of experts
gives thorough context to the kinds of pain felt by senior managers and leaders within the
logistics, force support, security forces, command staff, and civil engineering disciplines.
The listing is given in Table 25.
Table 25: List of 30 Issues
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Table 25 (con’t): List of 30 Issues

This data is significant since the responses represented the top issues on the minds of
these leaders, and one could reasonably deduce that precious organizational resources,
particularly time and attention, have been diverted to address them.
The pared down list of 13 challenges represented the issues that mangers and
leaders across multiple functional areas cared about the most. It may seem unreasonable
for a leader to tackle 30 challenges at once, so identifying the top issues is an effective
way to focus organizational resources in order to achieve the biggest bang for the
proverbial buck. Furthermore, the top 13 challenges were rank-ordered by the panel of
experts until the final list was achieved as illustrated in Table 27.
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Table 26: Rank-Ordered List of Top 13 Issues

The rigor and iterative process of the Delphi Study research method adds credibility to
these findings, since the research topic experts were given opportunity to contribute
opinions that were tempered and strengthened through consideration of the opinion of
other experts.
In terms of the original investigative questions, the joint basing Delphi Study
revealed some insights. The panel of experts agreed that publication and policy
differences between the joining Service installations were difficult to integrate, especially
in terms of morale spending and equipment inspections. Manpower challenges were
revealed by the panelists as a significant source of merger pain given the effects of most
efficient organization cuts by the supported Service prior to joint basing implementation.
Additionally, a lack of a manpower standard to match unique joint basing needs has
necessitated expensive contracts to fill in the manpower gap. Funding issues presented
themselves in the study in the form of budget cuts due to sequestration. One could argue
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that the cuts came at a most inopportune time given the entire gamut of challenges that
come from merging two organizations. Examples of organizational structure challenges
were identified as multiple chains of command (the case of two different Air Force
organizational hierarchies within the same joint base) and the case of having to report
information to the different Services (via both Air Force and Navy chains of command).
Significance of Research
This study bridged the research gap in identifying the top challenges of joint
based installations via a panel of expert study. Though some has been written on
reported challenges by joint bases either anecdotally or via GAO reports, there exists no
consolidated, rank-ordered list for managers/leaders. There are two contexts in which
this information is useful. The first context is the present one. The top challenges
intimated by the panel of experts are, in some cases, enduring issues that may or may not
be truly resolved. There is no doubt that workarounds have been created in order to
achieve mission success; however the optimal case entails fundamentally addressing the
difficulties with the full range of resources at the Department of Defense’s disposal.
The second case is one in which future BRACs attempt to further expand joint basing, or
in the extreme case, consolidate Services altogether. The list of challenges gives future
BRAC commissions some considerations for attempting joint basing again. This is
evident by the fact that GAO reports have correlated the lack of joint basing cost savings
data with implementation challenges (Government Accountability Office, 2012).
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Recommendations for Action
This section is organized by the researcher’s and the panelists’ recommendations
for actions. The recommendations are given within the contexts of future joint basing
attempts via the BRAC process.

Researcher Recommendations
The data suggests that there are 13 issues future BRAC commissions should
consider when joining installations of different military Services. Since the list is rankordered by a cross-functional panel of experts, the issues ranked highest would have the
broadest impact and, thus, should be addressed first. Senior military leaders should focus
departmental resources on the top issues, so that the original intent of joint basing,
namely cost savings, will be realized in the absence of major implementation challenges.

Panelist Recommendations
Table 27 summarizes the panelists’ ideas to overcome implementation issues for
future joint basing efforts. The information is given in context of the top 13 challenges
identified by the panel. The full list of recommendations is in Appendix B.
Table 27: Panelist Recommendations
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Table 27 (con’t)
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Table 27 (con’t)
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Table 27 (con’t)

Recommendations for Future Research
For future research, the researcher recommends the following:
1. Replicate this study at another Air Force-led installation in order to
validate the results. An additional study utilizing the Delphi method as the
methodology at one of the other six AF-led joint bases would further
strengthen the findings.
2. Replicate this study at other joint bases with different combinations of
Service-leads. There are many different combinations of supported and
supporting Components among other joint bases. Delphi Studies
concerning joint basing challenges on those bases would validate the
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transportability of the findings and recommendations to joint basing at
large.
3. Utilize other research methods such as mass survey or interviews to
validate the results of this study. This study was conducted among a panel
of the most senior personnel at the joint base being studied. A general
survey in the functions studied would glean the perspectives of those
lower in the organization. Interviews of senior leaders at the joint bases
might yield even more information as to the specific issues as part of the
general issues.
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con’t)
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Appendix B. Panel Recommendations
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Appendix B. Panel Recommendations (con’t)
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Appendix B. Panel Recommendations (con’t)
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Appendix B. Panel Recommendations (con’t)
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